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banished by the imposition of literate modes on popular electoral politics by Progressive reformers. We examine its
major channels of expression, bodily mass communication and public sensationalism, within a framework of classbased struggle, observing that the practice of live bodily assembly created broad points of entry into political life,
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The only weapon we have is our bodies.—Bayard Rustin
This essay seeks to retrieve a powerful mode of popular communication for a politics from which it is
now, but has not always been, missing. We will use the term congregational communication to describe
this instrumentality, which derives from deeply embedded social habits. As far back as the twelfth
century, to congregate meant to make oneself a companion and accompany others in mingling, singing,
ﬁghting, or worshiping. Despite more contemporary associations with religious gatherings,
congregations may amass as easily for rebellion as for worship, for lynching as for inauguration.
Congregations are not deﬁned by their moral achievements, but by the face-to-face circulation of a large
number of people aware of their own collectivity.
As we mean the term, congregations are a species of crowd. We are interested in political
crowds, or congregations, in US presidential campaigns during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Though congregational crowds are feared for their capacity to exercise physical force, this
potential lies at the heart of their political efﬁcacy. The capacity to control major sites of discourse
physically and symbolically is fundamental to political change.1 Congregational crowds have often
exercised power during the last two centuries, and still do. In terms of recent events only, Shia in Basra
gathered by the hundreds of thousands to stake a claim to the religious and political future of Iraq after
the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 pitted their bodies against a
regime and mesmerized the world. More than one hundred thousand citizens pressed for civil rights for
African Americans in the 1963 March on Washington, DC. Protesters disrupted the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago in 1968. Moscow crowds helped protect the Russian parliament from a coup of
its new democracy in 1991.
Powerful episodic crowds like these constitute one important form of congregational
communication. Regularly occurring ritual assemblies are another. These once played a key role in US
presidential elections, along with Independence Day the most important regularly occurring ritual
occasions of the nation. Because participation in presidential elections is the privilege and right of all

adult citizens, these recurring elections occupy a special place among US democratic rituals. By the end
of the nineteenth century, however, congregational crowds in popular elections had become
threatening to Progressive reformers and their allies. In the decades leading up to World War I, these
reformers maneuvered to introduce literate modes that supplanted the unique communicative powers
of electoral crowds, engineered their physical dispersal, and championed a notion of them as irrational
and undemocratic.
Restrictions on popular crowds removed a signiﬁcant means of forging and expressing what
Robert Putnam calls “bridging” and “bonding” social capital among white working classes and
immigrants, part of a more general elite effort to limit their participation in national politics.2 The
delegitimatization of this popular communicative resource in favor of literacy-based forms weakened
the challenge that less privileged classes could mount to a political system that had failed them in a
rapidly industrializing economy. Our title refers to how reformers transformed Election Day into a ritual
of “voting alone,” a solitary act performed in private by literate electors abstracted from any witnessing
or celebrating community. It plays on “bowling alone,” Putnam’s phrase for connecting the decline of
associational sociability to falling rates of public participation in the twentieth century. In time, those for
whom congregational crowds had been critical for mobilizing local allies and exerting local power
became the least civically active participants of all.
Despite their continuing importance in social life, crowds remain largely unexamined in
communication studies, 3 perhaps because they are thought to lack an essential capacity for rational
communication. This belief is a legacy of the period we examine, when reformers feared gatherings in
public and pursued strategies to remove them from national politics. Though crowds now and then
appear in the literature as receptive audiences, 4 they rarely appear as agents of coherent messages.
“Collective gatherings,” by contrast, are often described as message-bearing entities. Émile Durkheim,
for example, held a famously favorable view of the communicative efﬁcacy of collective gatherings,
asserting that society “cannot revitalize the awareness it has of itself unless it assembles.”5
Crowds are especially suspect to those who point out that solidarity is not the same as rational
decision-making. Nineteenth-century theories of the regressive psychology of crowds by Continental
writers such as Le Bon, Sighele, and Tarde articulated elite hostility to forms of power manifest in
unregulated popular assemblies.6 These theories inﬂuenced Progressive reformers in the US who were
vigilant to the dangers of the “crowd mind.”7 The history of crowds in US election rituals is thus tied to a
larger struggle for power between popular and elite classes. We believe this struggle can fruitfully be
mapped within a communicative framework of recurring class-based confrontations between bodily and
textual styles of communication. The following discussion elaborates that framework and applies it to
shifts in popular political communication at the end of the nineteenth century.

Elite Texts and Massed Bodies
Expressive bodily display is the preserve of the people, whose power and participation in society depend
on the value of their bodies for the cultural muscle-work that society ﬁnds useful, especially manual
labor and war. Textual expression is the preserve of those whose cultural power derives from
educational and other textualizing credentials.8 In general, the bodies of those with the power to
produce and use texts exert control over bodies that lack that power. The resulting story is never

exclusively one of textual triumph, since texts in industrialized societies may elide and suppress the body
but can never eliminate it.
This is not for lack of trying. Late nineteenth-century reformers criticized perambulatory
outdoor gatherings and preferred the “public” to be seated indoors conversing and reading newspapers.
In their view, literacy alone guaranteed virtuous civic behavior. It banished the menace of immediate
action, the weapon of the crowd, by manipulating time and public visibility to frustrate congregational
communication as an instrument of political participation. Most obviously, literate practice enforced
temporal delays in exchanges among speakers and audiences. Authors could not be heckled or
challenged during the writing process, and were long gone at the moment and site of published delivery.
By this means, elite expression in essays and newspapers was able to remove itself physically from
immediate popular engagement and criticism.
Elites also cultivated individual reputation and fame through civic written commentary. As a
practical matter, the highest form of literate civic action vouchsafed to ordinary citizens was the secret
written ballot—by comparison, a strikingly anonymous instrument. Counted ballots registered the
aggregate democratic verdict, but concealed what had previously been open to inspection; namely, the
identiﬁable political loyalties of live voters. These were barred from display at a moment when their
force and weight would be importantly manifest to like-minded allies or determined opponents.
Reformers argued that these and other literate constraints on popular participation prevented abuses
by the crowd. We argue that congregational crowds were engaged in a species of nontextual
communication worthy of analysis in its own right as a signiﬁcant and distinctive democratic
counterweight to elite power.
We will attend to two important components of nineteenth-century congregational
communication that we call bodily mass communication and public sensationalism. Bodily mass
communication was the immediate, live assembly of large groups in proximate, usually outdoor space
less vulnerable than indoor spaces to extraneous control. It featured multiple bodies experiencing
themselves as mutually present to one another. Collective scripted and unscripted expression offered a
variety of opportunities to observe and embrace public roles in a highly theatrical setting. This was the
mise-en-scène of public sensationalism, a dense, memorable sensory surround of immediate, publicly
shared sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches. Public sensationalism heightened emotional arousal
and channeled communicative intent. It marked off special occasions from ordinary events and drew
those with unpolished cultural tastes and sensibilities into common enactments. Public sensationalism
provided tools for rearranging public space and claiming it for the popular sphere.
We track the decline of congregational communication in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
rituals of presidential campaigning by reconceptualizing recent accounts of campaign practice in US
electoral history as skirmishes in a class-based, culturally fraught struggle between bodily and textual
styles of communication.9 We argue that textualized messages displaced amassed, tangible bodies as
the prevailing medium of ritual expression in presidential elections. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, electoral reforms emphasized the decorous, silent, and literate at the expense of
the spectacular, raucous, and bodily. Live popular spectacle was drastically curtailed. Bodies no longer
commingled in ways that integrated national politics with citizens’ concrete lives. Collective participation
was dislodged from the political center and appended to extra-local national campaigns that were deaf
to the distinctive aesthetic, temporal, sensory, and social rhythms of local communities.

We entertain scant nostalgia for nineteenth-century arrangements that barred women, blacks,
Chinese, Native Americans and other groups from full political participation. These restrictions reﬂected
a conservative popular politics structured by corporeal signiﬁers of race, gender, class, ethnicity, and
regional style, and enforced through bodily intimidation that aggrandized white male political power.
Important democratic elements nevertheless informed late nineteenth-century political rituals with
broadband modes of entry for genteel and vulgar public tastes and multiple afﬁrmations of the
importance of ordinary people. These elements were removed by twentieth-century elites, particularly
as they acquired momentum from industrialization and waves of European immigration. Since a good
deal of democratic theorizing has overemphasized the cerebral ideal of the informed citizen without
recognizing the somatic levels on which democratic political participation also occurs, these popular
elements have not been fully appreciated. They are our concern here. For, as the popular body was
dispersed and silenced at the turn of the twentieth century, elections became less compelling, large
segments of the population removed themselves from the process, and the horizons of democratic
possibility receded.
We focus on campaign practice from the Civil War to World War I, a period in which middle- and
upper-class antipathy toward working-class citizens effectively narrowed the popular franchise. The
struggle we describe between texts and bodies for control of presidential campaigns supports Alexander
Keyssar’s thesis that class antagonism was the chief obstacle to universal suffrage in the US during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 Though Keyssar concedes that race, gender, and ethnicity strongly
inﬂuence class position, he argues that class was the primary lens through which racial, gender, and
ethnic divisions were understood and acted out. We argue that communicative style was an equally
potent signiﬁer of class position. In the period we examine, texts fought bodies and won. We begin by
identifying traditional body-based components of presidential elections. Next, we discuss the unique
ritual information that bodies communicate. We examine how bodily mass communication and public
sensationalism conveyed the importance of elections, mounted civic appeals to less reﬁned sensibilities,
anointed individual participation with visible value, and dramatized popular power. We sketch the
transformation to less popular, more textualized election rituals by the 1910s. Finally, we show how
Americans continued to inhabit the disembodied political text during the 2000 presidential election.

Bodily Participation and Popular Electoral Rituals
The rise and fall of a distinctive popular political culture in the US is partly reﬂected in voting statistics
from 1840 to 1920. The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the highest voter turnouts in
American electoral history. While about half of today’s eligible voters cast ballots, 69 percent of eligible
citizens voted on average for all presidential elections between 1840 and 1872. For presidential
elections from 1876 to 1900, that average was 77 percent. Participation in Northern states, separately
considered, was higher still. From 1876 to 1900, 82 percent of Northerners cast ballots in presidential
elections. Twelve different states registered turnouts above 90 percent in at least one presidential
election during this period. These numbers dropped signiﬁcantly in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth
century. National turnout averaged 65 percent between 1900 and 1920, and 52 percent from 1920 to
1928. In the North during the same period, turnouts were 75 percent and 58 percent.11
Reported levels of electoral participation must be weighed against the fact that large segments
of the population were prohibited from voting. Women, slaves, Native Americans, and minors remained

disenfranchised throughout the nineteenth century. Free blacks voted only in a handful of states before
the Civil War. Despite the enfranchisement of African Americans by the Fifteenth Amendment (1870),
Jim Crow laws and social intimidation effectively reserved nineteenth-century voting to those who were
white, male, and twenty-one.12 Little correlation existed between voting levels and socioeconomic
status in the late nineteenth century. Generally speaking, working classes were as likely to vote as elites.
This changed as elections became much less successful in drawing in the young and working classes,
whose levels of participation declined steeply after 1900.13
Attention to voting alone also fails to capture how campaigns and elections actually unfolded in
nineteenth-century American life. Voting was only one facet of popular involvement in election rituals
and must be considered within the broader sweep of popular power. This included mob violence against
the abolitionist press and Reconstruction rioting by whites intent on removing federal force from the
South following the Civil War.14 Of more concern to Northern propertied classes was the exercise of
physical force by striking workers. Beginning with the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the ﬁrst nationwide
labor action, US workers increasingly used their massed bodies to protest low wages, long hours, and
unfair work rules. The number of strikes tripled in the mid-1880s, to about 1,500 in 1886, and remained
high into the 1890s. Between 1875 and 1910, workers clashed with troops nearly 500 times. This period
also saw some of the most infamous uprisings in US history, among them the Homestead steel workers’
strike of 1892 and the Pullman strike of 1894.15 Against this background, popular crowds transformed
late nineteenth-century presidential contests into charged public events that dramatized the force of
assembled bodies and challenged an elite textualized order.
Presidential elections acquired a characteristic sequence and form in the post-Civil War era. In
the spring of a presidential year, party activists assembled in ward, county, and state meetings to
nominate local and state candidates and to select delegates for the national convention later that
summer. By early summer, this participatory base had broadened to embrace political clubs formed for
the duration of the election. These clubs organized local ratiﬁcation ceremonies in which partisans
shouted out assent and support for nominees to the national conventions.16 Local party cadres raised
ﬂagpoles that ﬂuttered with partisan emblems and banners. They strove to cut down rivals’ ﬂagpoles in
a spirited effort to show whose pole was longest.
Political clubs organized marching companies to perform elaborate drill maneuvers in partisan
parades. Often held at night, these drew tens of thousands of marchers with brass bands, glee clubs,
processions of wagons, and seas of kerosene torchlights. As Election Day neared, “monster rallies”
attracted thousands more to large feasts and additional nighttime spectacle.17 Election Eve typically saw
one last torchlight procession as parties mobilized their troops for the next day’s battle. The climax of
these popular rites was Election Day, an ofﬁcial holiday in many states. This ritual timeout from routine
time was an all-day affair devoted to food, drink, and socializing.18 In contrast to today’s lengthy and
diffuse presidential campaigns, mid-nineteenth-century elections unfolded within a narrow interval that
roughly coincided with the growing season, referencing rhythms of bodily work that had grounded
centuries of settled collective life.
These activities made room for two groups excluded from voting, namely, white women and
young white men. Beginning in 1840, Whigs encouraged women to attend political rallies (10,000
reportedly waved handkerchiefs at a Dayton, Ohio rally) at which speakers ﬂattered them, and
newspaper editors boasted about their presence. Democrats soon organized similar events for women,

urging them to direct two-step ﬂows of political communication to their voting menfolk.19 Women
attended and marched in parades, in one case wearing sashes that proclaimed, “Whig Husbands or
None.”20 They decorated ﬂoats, hosted picnics and barbecues, lit their houses as their men passed by in
torchlight processions, and extinguished the same light when political rivals approached.21 In some
locales, they organized political clubs. After the Civil War, women presented home-sewn
commemorative banners to party leaders at local mass meetings to kick off election campaigns.22
Boys, the largest disenfranchised group besides women, occupied a prized place of their own in
electoral rituals. Adolescent white males recruited for marching companies often performed
synchronized routines in public processions.23 New Jersey tradition called for boys to build Election Eve
bonﬁres with conﬁscated boards, fences, and water barrels.24 Parades attracted young spectators of
both sexes and socialized them to the larger political culture.25
Framing these activities as ritual adds a useful dimension to more conventional accounts of
political participation. Though political activity may enlist ritual, ritual order is not political order,
broadly understood as the distribution of power and resources. According to Roy Rappaport, ritual is a
communicative form peculiarly designed to transmit certain kinds of information. It makes into res, or
realizes, what cannot be accomplished by other means. Its distinctiveness is indexically tied to bodily
presence. As Rappaport writes, “by performing a liturgical order the participants accept, and indicate to
themselves and others that they accept, whatever is encoded by the canon of that order.”26 What is
ritually encoded is the message that the group exists, and that its members have concrete obligations to
one another. Acceptance of this order is not manifest primarily as belief, an inward and private state,
but acted out before observing others who reciprocate by signifying their own public commitments.
Ritual indexically displays and morally enacts congregational existence by assembling bodies for mutual
sensory contact and circulation. Their very presence in ritual settings publicly signals their willingness to
participate in the group.27
Outdoor life in nineteenth-century towns was well suited for communities to experience
themselves ritually. Though social-convivial campaign gatherings fell short of the inclusive equality of
contemporary democratic ideals, they were unquestionably popular as rituals of unregulated public
encounter. The looseness of popular crowds stood in marked contrast to European courtly traditions.
Aristocratic rituals of theater, jousting, dancing, and religion conveyed what Habermas has called
“representation[s] of publicness”28 by closely regulating the location and movement of participants’
bodies in roles reserved to the nobly born and specially elevated. Popular electoral rituals in the US
presented few restrictions on gestures and permitted the comparatively free circulation of bodies. (By
contrast, restraints imposed by nineteenth-century US elites on bodily expression among audiences for
theater, opera, and symphony foreshadowed their domination of other aspects of twentieth-century
culture, including political campaigns.29) Though access was far from total, social boundaries were also
signiﬁcantly more permeable in US election rituals.
Congregational communication in the popular sphere was never the rational-critical discussion
of the Habermasian public sphere. The fertile fostering of body-based links through unregulated
circulation created local traditions of participation in parades, rallies, ﬂagpole-raising, drinking, feasting,
voting and speech-making. Participation sometimes enacted celebratory unity, other times murderous
confrontation. Though popular crowds could be convinced of their own charismatic morality in
moments of public excitement, virtue was never the deﬁner of the popular. If the bourgeois public

sphere was constituted in textualized genteel discussion by a restrained and feminized “reading public,”
the popular sphere was constituted in ﬂuid, unfettered circulation within a domain of public
sensationalism. Its deﬁning character was the muscle power lodged in amassed bodies boldly laying
claim to public space. These displays threatened elites, who sometimes deployed domestic armies of
uniformed soldiers and police, the visible antithesis of the unregulated crowd, to seize public space from
freely moving masses.

Sensing Public Life: Obvious Aspects of Campaign Ritual
Bodily mass communication linked participants in festivals, feasting, ﬁghting, rallies, and other public
gatherings. It was enhanced by public sensationalism, an immediate surround of dense sensory cues
that heightened collective experience and marked it as out of the ordinary. Public sensationalism
constitutes the surface element of ritual, what Rappaport calls its “obvious aspects.” Extraordinary,
shared sensations drew attention to lived time and space by dramatizing and intensifying bodily
experience to make it memorable. Public places ﬁlled with sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches
drew community members to deﬁnable spaces. They focused collective attention. Public sensationalism
signaled to ordinary people that elections were signiﬁcant, and participation in them mattered.
Multiple modes of sensory stimulation courted a broad demographic swath. Popular songs with
nonsense lyrics, stem-winding democratic oratory delivered to large crowds, nighttime seas of torchlight
and ﬂame, mass quantities of roasted meats, whiskey, hard cider, and beer appealed to less delicate
political tastes. Fireworks, caged animals, balloon ascents, costumed adults and glee clubs offered up
satisfying sensations for entire families. One observer understood the power of public sensationalism
exactly. “They have discovered in this country the effects of the spectacular and the auricular,” he
wrote, “and they have applied it on a characteristically vast scale. You can disregard argument; you can
ignore self-interest; you can forget country; you can even refuse a bribe. But you cannot fail to see and
hear and to be struck well-nigh resistless by so imperious and masterful appeal to the senses of the
body.”30
Election Day was a noisy affair. Amassed citizens, not mass-mediated commentators, made the
public sounds. The democratic noises of bands, cannons and loud voices called the popular body to rites
of civic regeneration. Polling places were beehives of voters boisterously hailing friends and
acquaintances.31 From her front porch, a Missouri woman heard “hollering, screaming, cursing, and
swearing that is constantly disturbing the peace.”32 Amidst indecorous sounds of popular celebration,
partisans gathered to out-sing and out-cheer their opponents. An observer noted “an endless ﬂutter of
ﬂuttering ﬂags, monstrous devices, a din of ﬁfe, trumpet and drum and the endless ﬁring of light and
heavy artillery.”33 Finding his polling booth surrounded by Whigs bent on preventing their opponents
from voting, a Democratic voter recalled, “Some halloed one thing and some another. Some imitated
the Barking of Dogs and some the Roaring of Bulls, all making as much noise as they could.”34
Elections featured special tastes. Election-day cakes baked by the women of the community
were a favorite tradition, but public drink dominated the realm of popular taste. Liquor communicated
and created festivity. Local candidates and party workers dispensed free alcohol, typically the greatest
Election Day expense.35 In one city, Democrats brought voters to the polls in wagons stocked with
whiskey barrels. Citizens also carried their own ﬂasks and stood treat for drinks. A California voter

reported having as many as 25 drinks in an hour with his friends, during which “many of us got pretty
essentially tight.”36 To some voters, drinking was the point of elections. A voter arrested in 1856 for
disturbing the peace sang, “I’m no politician, nor ever shall be/ The job of my life is to go on a spree/
Whoever is president is all one to me/ While I can get gloriously corned.”37 Repeated Election Day
efforts to regulate New Jersey saloons during the 1880s were mostly futile.38
Liquor facilitated rituals of public touch—from handshakes and other amicable connecting rites
to physical intimidation. A Mississippian remarked that men gathered “for the triple purpose of voting,
spreeing and lastly for the peculiar pleasure of witnessing the beginning-aye, ‘The Opening of the Fall
Fighting Campaign.’ ”39 The very possibility of violence heightened ritual drama and interest. Partisan
toughs, “b’hoys” and “shoulder strikers” staged real and sham ﬁghts to keep timid opponents from the
polls.40 Election Day mobs armed with rocks, brickbats, guns and knives caused signiﬁcant bloodletting
and accounted for at least 89 deaths between 1828 and 1861.41
Contemporary “campaigns” are pale echoes of the pugilistic rehearsals that dominated popular
elections from the 1850s to 1890s. Agonistic masculine drama representing the force of the popular
body coursed through nineteenth-century political rhetoric. Electoral sensations frequently suggested
preparation for war, and parties understood their work as mobilizing every eligible voter. Deploying
slogans such as “Falter not before the enemy,” each side marshaled troops to battle the opposition.
Political clubs formed marching orders with “captains” and “lieutenants.” These orders paraded in every
style of uniform from kepis and oilskin capes to elaborate military dress accessorized with leather spats,
belt, gloves, and dress headgear. Brandishing torchlights that resembled riﬂes, political foot soldiers
executed intricate drills to crisp military commands. Parades mimicked battleﬁelds with gun and cannon
ﬁre, ﬁreworks, skyrockets, roman candles spewing from “volcano wagons,” and the smell of sulfur and
smoke. Accompanied by brass bands, martial songs issued from the bellowing voices of marching men
and ofﬁcers on horseback.42 On such occasions, young, especially working-class men, were ritual actors
in barely restrained displays of masculine violence intended to thrill and intimidate spectators in the
streets. Just as royal processions symbolized and displayed political power backed by force, pageants of
marching men presented themselves as the democratic sovereign whose formidable strength likewise
could be mobilized. When violence did erupt from volatile shifts of crowd mood, or exerted itself against
group obstacles or other persons, it enacted tactile communication that conveyed popular power in the
most direct terms. When this era ended after World War I, a powerful avenue of body-based political
expression was effectively closed.
Voting provided important shared sensations of its own. Until the 1890s, exercising the
franchise was a communally observed, public act. Visually distinct ballots printed and distributed by
political parties told onlookers what ticket a voter had deposited.43 Openly voting a straight ticket was
customary, though some electors created bobtail tickets by tearing names off the ballot, or vestpocket
votes by hiding their tickets all the way up to the ballot box.44 For the most part, voting the ticket was a
semi-public display of party afﬁliation frequently met with offers of solidarity in the coin of jobs or
friendships.45 These gestures grounded open communication before peers in networks of public opinion
that allowed individuals to communicate particularistic contributions to the constitution of the body
politic.
Public balloting was accompanied by rituals of reciprocity in which electors received direct signs
that individual participation mattered. Though charges of “vote buying” were freely tossed around in

the nineteenth century, the exact meaning of this term remains in dispute. Small monetary payments
and in-kind treating were common on election days.46 In some towns, “ﬂoaters” did sell their votes to
the highest bidder. More often, cash and in-kind transactions such as drink buying were festive public
rewards for party work and loyalty.47 Reciprocity was sometimes supplemented by coercion. On Election
Day, party emissaries cajoled, browbeat, and transported electors to the polls.48 Such demonstrations
rendered visibly concrete each elector’s connection to the popular democratic body and made it hard to
doubt the signiﬁcance of voting.
Some historians have questioned the depth and breadth of popular commitment behind such
lavish campaign activity. Altschuler and Blumin suggest that presidential elections were high points in a
political culture that faded from view in off-year elections, and that nineteenth-century Americans were
emotionally disengaged from public life.49 In this light, rallies and parades appear less as spontaneous
expression than party artiﬁce, and as spectacles of entertainment more than engaged politics. They
argue that candidates were designated less by popular choice than by political insiders who engineered
electoral outcomes with vote-buying strategies and get-out the-vote schemes. Finally, they suggest that
politics was widely regarded with cynicism and doubt.
These observations can be read differently by focusing on how rituals work. That popular politics
had periods of low intensity, with off-year elections generating less hoopla and people quickly resuming
normal lives after Election Day,50 suggests that presidential elections took place within a ritually distinct
interval able to attract high levels of public interest. It must also be acknowledged that little large-scale
democratic participation of any kind passes the test of collective spontaneity. Ritual nearly always
depends on deliberate organizing efforts that count as public evidence for it instead of detracting from
its value. Finally, claims that nineteenth-century campaigns were entertainment rather than politics
generate a false dichotomy based on a narrow view of politics as serious business devoted to intellect
and not sentiment. Popular politics drew in participants from many different realms by ﬁnding ways to
be compelling to all of them. This heterogeneity was a ritual strength, not a shortcoming.
Bodily mass communication provided modes of entry into public life for sensibilities unmoved by
the niceties of political discussion and unencumbered by copious political information. It assembled the
people for the purpose of reafﬁrming themselves in all political circumstances. Witnessing, sensing, and
acting together created a res publica of mutual solidarity among bodies singing, shouting, swaying, or
marching together, occupying shared space, collectively embracing and repelling other bodies. Such
activity rendered public opinion concrete and formidable. The body politic was viscerally present and
passionately apprehended. Shared perceptions, social connections, and massed bodily force constituted
the essential resources of popular communication and power. As strikes and other forms of labor unrest
drew on and absorbed popular election experiences, they magniﬁed the concerns of those who
distrusted popular will and sentiment as base, and more, as hostile to elite interests.

Textualizing Popular Ritual
For most of the nineteenth century, popular elections featured the visual excess of too many bodies to
take in at a glance, the aural excess of sounds of war, the tactile excess of male bodies primed with
alcohol and partisan emotion, and the gustatory excess of roasted animals consumed en masse. Such
spectacles were the antithesis of bourgeois reﬁnement. They offended elites and middling sorts focused

on more delicate indoor activities of parlor and study, including discussion, silent reading, intimate
gatherings of family and friends, and solitary prayer.51 In the 1880s, Newark Republicans bristled at “the
‘push’ and ‘squeeze’ and sometimes dirty contact of a crowded polling place.”52 They reﬂected the
patrician sentiments of those who preferred to distance their bodies from a popular politics they
regarded as impure.
Between the 1880s and World War I, reformers made stringent efforts to purge presidential
elections of public sensationalism and to suppress bodily mass com munication. By purifying these
popular aspects of presidential election ritual, they also transformed its meaning. Citizens were less
likely to enact electoral ritual in democratic masses, more likely to encounter mass mediated texts
detached from collective contexts. Spectacular, raucous bodily public idioms no longer staked a familiar,
structured claim on popular politics. Massed bodies, locally rooted and dramatically unpredictable, gave
way to the newly mobile, singular bodies of presidential candidates, whose remotely mediated images
were ﬁxed in standardized forms. Dispersed and driven indoors, the democratic mass became less
visible, audible and real. Eviscerated and textualized, it gradually became the abstract and imagined
political entity it is today.
Textualized voting disenfranchised those bodies most feared by elites and the middling classes.
In the ﬁfty years after 1860, voter registration laws enforced through new regimes of the written word
demobilized large numbers of Northern immigrant working classes, Southern blacks and poor whites.53
Beginning in the late 1880s, seventeen states imposed literacy tests for voting. In the South, Jim Crow
laws bypassed the Fifteenth Amendment’s (1870) enfranchisement of African Americans.54 Between
1900 and 1926, eleven states repealed laws enfranchising aliens who publicly swore their intentions to
become citizens. By 1928, no alien in any state had the right to vote for a candidate for any ofﬁce for the
ﬁrst time in a century.55 Bodily oaths were invalidated, and immigrants were required to bring
citizenship papers to the polls. Nine Northern states instituted literacy tests before 1920.56 Echoing the
views of many Progressive era reformers, the Newark Evening News wrote in 1900 that “the man who
can neither read nor write demonstrates a lack of intelligence or ambition that should disqualify him
from exercising the highest prerogative of American citizenship.”57
As legislative reforms swept the country in the late 1880s, the ballot was also puriﬁed. Thirtyeight states passed new ballot laws between 1888 and 1892.58 Many of them mandated uniform ballots
printed on standard paper on which only the names of duly certiﬁed candidates could appear. Ballots
often had to be authoritatively stamped and distributed by “sworn public ofﬁcials,” not “paid political
workers,” as the New York Ballot Reform League framed the alternatives.59 Buffer zones were drawn
around polling places to exclude onlookers, and voters were required by law to shield their ballots from
public gaze.60 Private literate effort replaced public performance and display as voting became a matter
of decoding lists of printed names and properly marking ballots.
Secret balloting signiﬁcantly changed the meaning of voting. The franchise had been a public act
of political afﬁliation undertaken in the presence of others who were spectators, judges, allies, and
interlocutors in the constitution of a local public opinion that could not be ignored or denied. Secret
balloting silenced this communicative dimension. Voting no longer “obviously” constituted or reﬂected
local bonds. The signiﬁcance of one anonymous, socially ungrounded vote for president, among millions,
now seemed far from obvious. Any single vote seemed only to ratify distant state power. Exchanges of
money had likewise recognized social and political debts incurred. In the reform era, states strove to

keep any money from changing hands. In 1906, the State of New Jersey hired detectives to police “vote
buying” and enforced anti-liquor laws with new vigor.61
Reformers were also bent on purging many of the sights and sounds that had communicated the
distinctiveness of Election Day. Bonﬁres were classiﬁed as safety hazards. Election-night ﬁreworks,
horns, and sirens were banned as public nuisances.62 Previously rowdy city wards were now “devoid of
any of the real old time excitement,” the Atlantic City Evening Union wrote.63 Observers called elections
“listless,” “dull,” and “exceedingly quiet,” and remarked on the “astonishing lethargy” of the
population.64 Without tangible signs that their votes mattered or obvious sensations to tell them this
day was different, citizens fell back on abstract notions of doing their civic duty. Unsurprisingly, voter
turnout dropped: nationally, from a 77 percent average between 1876 and 1900, to 65 percent from
1900 to 1920, and 52 percent from 1920 to 1928; in the North, from over 82 percent to 75 percent and
58 percent for the same periods.65
What was true of Election Day was true of the whole campaign. The spectacular popular
campaign was fast receding into memory by the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century.66 In the
countryside, all-day rallies with parades and speeches declined after 1900. Urban communities followed
suit. Torchlight parades and daytime processions were all but gone by 1908. Loyal partisans no longer
illuminated homes or businesses. Parties seldom hired brass bands or assembled glee clubs. Election
bets with public payoffs, once common, became an oddity. The campaign clubs that formed the
backbone of organized popular politics dwindled after the 1890s. Uniformed marching companies were
virtually extinct by 1912. The Newark Star wrote in 1908, “The political value of these demonstrations
have [sic] been seriously questioned by campaign managers who pointed to their excessive cost and
argued that the money expended could be put to better uses—notably, printed matter, mailings, and
advertising.67 In effect, the parties redirected money and energy from the popular mass to elitecontrolled mass communication.
Popular bodies deferred to two kinds of textual elites. One championed a puriﬁed, disembodied
politics of individual conscience and dispassionate principle disembedded from partisan spectacles ﬁlled
with rich emotion and sensory excess. It favored informational texts to educate and discipline the
masses. A second elite deployed new textual technologies of advertising and public relations to compete
with public sensationalism by packaging presidential campaigns with pithy slogans and mechanically
reproduced likenesses. Presidential campaigning gradually shifted from multiple encounters among
ordinary citizens to remote visions of the elevated singular bodies of candidates. Regular, raucous
political participation retreated to indoor, intimate, and private social space. Elites contrasted the
orderly literate habits of an abstract public to the muscular unpredictability of the crowd. Deliberative
public opinion, a new entity, was celebrated as a beneﬁt to all. In actuality, such equality was more
abstract than real, since deliberative resources found their greatest purchase among the educated.
Through secret balloting and new restrictions on electoral eligibility, literate elites stripped political
agency from assembled, socially linked popular bodies. The bodily ground of election ritual shifted from
congregational masses rooted in concrete community relationships to the singular, abstractly social
bodies of newly mobile presidential candidates.
Two new political styles emerged: educational and advertised politics.68 One modeled
middlebrow education; the other, advertising and public relations. Both deployed literate modes in
which popular bodily idioms found little place. Both favored textual distribution to distant audiences

over locally performed and evaluated bodily gestures. Following the Civil War, elite reformers pursued
the educational style in national campaigns of the printed word.69 Mugwumps early yoked the ideal of
informed citizenship to anti-partisan independent-mindedness, but both major parties adopted this
notion with a vengeance by 1892. Beginning in the 1870s, party “information bureaus” printed millions
of documents on tariffs, free silver, and other issues. Educational campaigns sought “less noise and
more solid work.” They aimed “to supply voters with the ‘right kind’ of literature.”70 Printed party
platforms likewise increased in length and detail. No more than a page and a half in the 1880s, by the
1910s they routinely ran four to eight pages. Addressed to solitary readers, their arena was private and
domestic; their tone was earnest, favoring sobriety and conscience over sensationalism. “This is not a
campaign of noise and dazzle,” observed the Cleveland Plain Dealer of the 1892 race, “but of reading, of
thinking and of work.”71 Printed platforms seemed to make bodily mass communication unnecessary.
Where information came directly from the national organization, there was little need to work out
political views in concert with others, a socially unpredictable process beyond the supervision of elites
and potentially threatening to them.
Changes in journalism went hand in hand with educational politics. Though media had always
been part of political campaigns, the relative balance between bodies and texts now shifted
disproportionately towards the latter. Nineteenth-century newspapers had spoken for party
organizations whose funds often supported them. As urban audiences increased in size, literacy, and
afﬂuence during the 1870s and 1880s, big-city newspapers cultivated new readers and constructed new
relationships to them. Editors trumpeted a new kind of journalism that served the public good by
remaining independent of party. Reporters, increasingly “educated men,” sounded the virtues of
deliberative politics and “accurate, factual” news, replacing partisan drama and loyalty with impartial,
distanced views of the facts. Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst wooed the jilted popular body
for a new kind of urban mass press that appealed to sensory experience with lavish illustrations, banner
headlines, color printing, stunts and crusades, and lurid stories of crime and sex.
Both the independent and mass press stigmatized partisan subjectivity. The independent press
championed professional textual expertise as a reﬂection of lofty, high-minded devotion to education
and independence from political partisanship. Though it avoided explicit class appeals, this vision was in
truth class-speciﬁc, offering a self-absorbed and narrowed politics that most appealed to middle and
upper classes. The mass press engaged political stories as gossip rather than public affairs, and derided a
politics of ideas in favor of a politics of personalities and private lives. Journalism thus colluded in a
textually driven split between thought and feeling, associating good politics with dry civic pedagogy, and
feeling and emotion with low prejudice. If the independent press made politics too complicated for
working class readers, the mass press trivialized it. Forced to compete with independent and sensational
styles, the party press abandoned its traditional role of creating a politically comprehensible world for
readers in partisan terms while shifting its economic base from partisan expressions of political
preferences to advertising.
Advertised politics was the second textualized mode deployed in presidential campaigning.72
Where educational politics emphasized policy and principle, advertised politics presented presidential
candidates as personalities. Advertised politics circulated pithy fragments of discourse as “advance
copy,” rendering actual bodily utterance nearly superﬂuous. Whereas educational politics relied on
traditional technologies of plate matter and pamphlets and elite rules of discourse, advertised politics
seized on representational modes associated with emerging technologies of mass communication. Its

tools were advertising, public relations, mass-circulation daily newspapers, half-tone engravings, motion
pictures, and later, radio and television. All these created the candidate as a textualized presence
detached from local and community relations of the sort dramatized and enacted in spectacular partisan
display. Though not fully deployed until the 1916 campaign, the advertised style had germinated for two
decades in the parties’ new national “publicity bureaus” where the inventors of modern public relations,
Ivy Lee, George F. Parker, and George Creel, had all apprenticed. Its practitioners angled strategically for
coverage by purchasing full-page ads from independent-minded print media in steady retreat from
traditional partisan loyalties. They helped direct money toward textual and advertising elites and away
from ordinary voters and body-based partisan spectacle.
Candidate bodies moved deﬁnitively into the public arena during the bitterly fought 1896
campaign in which both presidential contenders actively campaigned for the ﬁrst time. In the semipublic space of his Ohio front yard, William McKinley displayed himself almost daily to journalists and
supporters. William Jennings Bryan traveled to twenty-nine states in a strategy calculated to capture
coverage in newspapers, most of which were editorially opposed to Democrats.73 Popular bodies
receded from view in presidential campaigns to be replaced by proliferating images of the bodies of
candidates. These were readily abstracted into newspaper and campaign texts that aimed at dispersed
national audiences and bypassed particularistic local webs of class and social relations. Along with
stickers and posters inscribed with trademark slogans like “Full Dinner Pail” and “Poverty or Prosperity,”
Republicans distributed millions of mechanically reproduced images of McKinley. Theodore Roosevelt
famously observed that Republican chairman Mark Hanna had “advertised McKinley as if he were a
patent medicine!”74
While street protests by suffragists in the 1910s demonstrated the ongoing power of amassed
bodies to press for democratic reforms, the popular body was no longer a regular player in American
political life by the time women gained the vote in 1920.75 Ballot reform and textualized campaigns of
education and advertising had helped engineer the end of the democratic crowd as the bodily ground of
election ritual. As locally produced campaign spectacles withered, and Election Day revelry died down,
campaign crowds gathered mostly when presidential candidates came to town. Where outdoor
assemblies once had given form to the rhythms and relations of local political life, distant party elites
supervised the schedules of whistle-stop gatherings that displayed little interest in homegrown
traditions.
As popular bodies migrated to alternative rites of sport, religion, and mass entertainments,
collective attention shifted from political and labor spheres to consumption, games, and spirituality. By
the 1890s, professional baseball and college football gathered large crowds in less open, less
perambulatory spaces that were increasingly yoked to commercialism. Dwight Moody and Billy Sunday
updated an American tradition of mass religious revivals, in which shouting, swaying bodies were
restrained by Protestant morals, and bourgeois manners disciplined the rougher side of the electoral
congregation. New amusement parks furnished new, mechanically manufactured bodily sensations and
electriﬁed some of the nocturnal excitement and social fertility of torchlight electoral parades. Civic
sympathies sounded a minor chord in these commercially pitched spectacles of bodily mass
communication.
With the eclipse of body-based electoral communication, US citizens had lost a unique way of
experiencing themselves as publicly assembled congregations engaged in civic rituals of consequence.

As the electoral crowd waned, so did its political power. Gone were recurring exhibitions of muscular
force in the disciplined, latent violence of the march and the unrestrained violence of the mob. Bodily
mass communication had been a powerful magnet for people of less reﬁned tastes and less discursive
dispositions. This was especially true of the young and working classes, two groups dramatically
disengaged from contemporary elections. As the drama and pageantry of voting were textualized, the
thinner sensationalism of the mediated word supplanted live electoral sensations. Public opinion was no
longer felt and experienced concretely, but simulated in aggregated votes and statistically drawn polls.
In an earlier era, the congregational crowd had informed itself of the collective and individual
importance of its members. In spite of being socially partial in their constitution, the popular electoral
rituals of that era compare favorably in inclusiveness and democratic procedure to contemporary rituals
in which candidates and elite commentators occupy the symbolic center; wealthy, textually certiﬁed
elites pull the strings, and the public is concealed and dispersed in private and semi-private indoor
spaces.
Conspicuous investments of local energy and treasure in nineteenth-century electoral contests
displayed and strengthened the alluvial, recursive sociability of community life. Criss-crossing social and
political bonds created sturdy networks through which local power ﬂowed. Texts as a contemporary
political mode, by contrast, are largely indifferent to surplus social value created by bodily mass
communication, the better to ﬂow unimpeded through channels directed at those whose sole value to
political elites is the mobilizeability of their votes. Throughout the twentieth century, dispersed
communities became increasingly tethered to a national center by centralized political communication,
civic education, and mass media. These textual forms were able to bypass, and thus helped to atrophy,
the political and social links binding local citizens to one another. Streamlined political communication
also narrowed the messages that passed between ordinary citizens and political elites on terms speciﬁed
by the latter. The socially thinnest dimension of voting, mere number, projected a politics divorced from
bodies. Deprived of that power, they offered no barrier to centralizing national elites and withered as a
political force.

The 2000 Presidential Election: Voting Alone
The popular body was a signiﬁcant, though unacknowledged, player in the most famous controversy in
recent US presidential election history, the 2000 race between George W. Bush and Al Gore. A perilous
moment of that contest came when a menacing mob of partisans intimidated Miami-Dade County
election commissioners debating a vote recount. During the time the vote was in dispute, street crowds
asserted themselves across Florida, at the Texas governor’s mansion in Austin and at the vicepresidential residence in Washington, DC. This unaccustomed embodiment of strong partisan sentiment,
a throwback to the lively nineteenth-century electoral crowd, was widely deplored as menacing and
contrived.
For a moment, it seemed that bodies might decide the election through hand recounts locally
negotiated, but that moment passed. The US Supreme Court ruled that bodies must remove themselves
from proximity to the ballots to prevent further contamination. As it had in the early twentieth century,
the historical strength of the reforming impulse kept bodies and texts at a purifying distance from one
another in this most important of national rituals. A review of the disputed counties by the US Civil
Rights Commission showed that ballots cast by African Americans—the most suspect stratum of bodies

in the national electoral imagination—were ten times more likely to be rejected by textual rules for valid
ballots than those cast by white voters.76 Cast in textualized form, tribal exclusivity remained the order
of the day.
Beyond the extraordinary events in Florida, which bodies merely threatened to unravel, the
national election presented the usual story of textual triumph and bodily disengagement. In an election
ofﬁcially too close to call, voter turnout was 51 percent, in line with a long-term decline over the
twentieth century. Though pundits claimed the lesson of Florida was the sanctity and power of
individual votes, unguarded remarks occasionally belied these sentiments. In a humorous aside, a New
York Times columnist betrayed an elite disposition to value individual voters mostly in the abstract: “We
treasure the idea that any one individual’s ballot could decide an election. But watching the interviews
with some of the men and women on the street in Florida, you can’t help think, oh, Lord, not that
one.”77
Ordinary voters in the 2000 elections knew they were not consequential players. Handfuls of
votes rarely determine presidential elections, and Florida was more anomaly than lesson. Modern
elections mostly range the elite forces of the advertised style of politics against those of the educational
style, leaving most of the country out of the loop. In the wake of Florida, some reformers championed
textual remedies to correct ballot irregularities with voting machines designed to minimize bodily
contact with the ballot. Others proposed to remove the body altogether by standardizing local election
procedures and automating vote counts entirely. All ignored the continuing disengagement of popular
bodies from the political process. The passionately engaged popular body so feared by nineteenthcentury political elites thus stands in sharp contrast to the popular body of today. This latter body elicits
neither fear nor respect, since it is nowhere concretely to be found. Mediated punditry invokes it largely
in the breach. It is remarked on dismissively, as in the words of the Times columnist above; abstractly, in
what George W. Bush called “that big swath of red on the map” of televised election returns;78 and now
and then in reverent genuﬂection to the deliberative ideal that has put an end to it.
In the election of 2000, the candidates’ bodies were as mobile as ever, traveling in an attempt to
generate political spectacle and popular audiences. Sometimes they were successful; often they were
not. The alienation of everyday bodies was reﬂected in this account of the presidential campaign’s ﬁnal
week:
For a moment on Monday morning, Sandra Shipley thought she might head over to Portland
Community College to see the man she prefers to be the next president of the United States, Vice
President Al Gore. Don Hagar thought, brieﬂy, of attending an afternoon rally at Memorial
Coliseum for his man, Gov. George W. Bush. Instead, Ms. Shipley shopped for shoes, and Mr. Hagar
went for a 10-mile run. “He’s not a very exciting speaker,” Ms. Shipley, 32, a part-time student,
said of Mr. Gore. “I mean, as a Democrat, I’m voting for him. That should be enough.” Mr. Hagar,
42, a sales manager for a computer parts company, was hardly more apologetic. “The way they
promoted the event, I knew they wouldn’t miss me,” he said. 79

These citizens saw their bodies as superﬂuous to collective gatherings that once lay at the heart of
campaign ritual. In response, the candidates offered nothing sensational to engage face-to-face
audiences. These voters expressed their apathy by choosing alternative body-focused activities,
pampering the body in one case, disciplining it in the other. Both voiced the broad piety that only voting
is a signiﬁcant political act.

On important occasions when the candidates were brought before the masses, the masses were
instructed to behave themselves. Normative talk around the nationally televised presidential debates
presumed an electorate of informed, independent-minded citizens whose bodies could not be trusted to
remain silent and decorous. A letter to the editor of the New York Times urged the evacuation of
popular bodies from the deliberative ﬁeld of rational, unbiased observation.
Now that the presidential debate format has been settled … there is one detail that is necessary
for these debates to be fair: the local audience should absolutely not be shown on the air. If it
were, millions of TV viewers would be distracted and possibly biased by the reactions of that
audience, at the risk of defeating the entire purpose of these debates: to give the country the
opportunity to view and evaluate the candidates being themselves, pure and simple. 80

Popular bodies threatened to attach the presidential candidates to “local” audiences of supporters and
detractors instead of allowing them to stand, godly, alone.
The elite journalist selected to moderate three nationally televised debates forbade crowd
participation at the ﬁrst of them and clamped strict limits on partisan enthusiasm:
There’s a small audience in the hall tonight. They are not here to participate, only to listen. I have
asked and they have agreed to remain silent for the next 90 minutes except for right now when
they will applaud as we welcome the two candidates.81

Except as silent spectators, popular bodies were banished from the debates. The small and grudging
exhibition of feeling allowed them was closely monitored. They were still more forcefully admonished
before the second debate:
The audience participants … shall not ask follow-up questions or otherwise participate in the
extended discussion. And the questioner’s microphone will be turned off after he or she completes
asking the question.82

Thus were onlookers barred from affective displays and permitted only the most truncated participation
in the much-touted rational discussion of the issues.
When, on another occasion, a broadcast network organized focus groups meant to provide
deliberative civic simulacra for viewers, participants were unsure how to act. These citizen
“undecideds,” unaccustomed to having their bodies publicly included in the campaign, fell back on the
ritual props of the cerebral voter:
The participants, jittery at ﬁrst, clutched pens and pads and took pages and pages of notes during
the debate. As the cameras prepared to beam them to the nation, they fell utterly silent.83

There were faint echoes of the lost customs of nineteenth-century politics. Before their public
performance, the participants “munched on a buffet dinner of chicken and meatballs” and got their
“marching orders” from a CNN executive. For this well-fed statistical sample, “marching” meant sitting
still for turn-taking parlor conversation among others with whom they shared mainly a lack of conviction
about the candidates. By such means, tentative, engineered talk has supplanted mass bodily noise as
the characteristic sound of modern elections. The embodied electoral crowd has largely ceased to be
visible to itself or anyone else. Cut off from itself as the body politic, it has become the logical product of
the modern election process— the socially detached, apathetic class of “undecideds.” Unanchored in a
materially obvious political life, it is sporadic, uninterested, and free-ﬂoating.

Meanwhile, the textual armies of advertised politics grew richer from political business. An
expert array of journalists, pollsters, media buyers, telemarketers, ad agencies, and political consultants
deployed arsenals of computer databases, direct mail, websites, and media outlets to assault
demographic clusters reconstructed as a “public” in numerical form. If money is the symbolic marker of
who counts, the ﬂow of cash to media and consulting organizations announced the lopsided victory of
textual elites over the electorate. Candidates spent more than one billion dollars on political advertising,
little of which found its way to ordinary citizens. No campaign ﬁnance reform proposal suggested free
drinks or token payments for voters who took the trouble to trek to the polls to perform an abstract
civic duty.
In conclusion, it may be said that modern presidential politics is a struggle among textual elites
for control of a central political ritual in which popular bodies ﬁnd little purchase. Neither advertised
politics nor high-minded deliberation offers much celebration, broad-based invitation, or fun. Neither is
fertile or spacious enough to constitute a broadly popular political life. This is regrettable, since elections
are about more than choosing a mass-circulated presidential personality or piously discussing issues.
They are also rites of solidarity in which participants may revel in popular power for its own sake.
Progressive Era puriﬁcation and textualization of campaign rituals commenced a long era of bodily
disengagement from presidential elections in the US. Though reformers hoped to banish congregational
crowds that did not share their more reﬁned civic sensibilities, the bodily mass communication and
public sensationalism they purged remain unique forms of political communication whose social bonds
and collective messages are duplicated by no other means than live assembly.
It remains to ask what lessons can be drawn from this legacy of distrust for the forms of political
expression and challenge that congregational crowds offer. Faced with continuing civic disengagement
in the US, a number of voices have begun to argue for the democratic value of a physically celebratory
politics.84 Does this mean that people should vote ignorant, drunk, and disorderly? What should be the
role of political crowds in the twenty-ﬁrst century? Are bullyboys ever a legitimate expression of political
partisanship?
Though nineteenth-century election rituals were not uniformly inclusive and tolerated abuses
that would no longer be acceptable, they remain democratically instructive. Live public sensations
created broad points of entry into civic life, socialized the young, and appealed to less reﬁned political
dispositions. They suffused common space with uncommon sensations jointly shared. Popular social
movements have drawn upon these aspects of crowd-based ritual ever since, often with powerful
results. But crowds always remain unpredictable, and their potential for disturbance remains. It should,
since the mere textualization of civic life is no guarantee of democracy. While crowds may be antidemocratic on some occasions, on others they may be all the democracy there is.
The line that congregational crowds ought to toe is not a theoretical but a historical question to
be worked out in the press of political give and take. Bodily mass communication and public
sensationalism have their democratic uses, even in excessive and impolite forms. History shows clearly
that not only bodily groups move in herds. It is sometimes forgotten that in Germany in 1932, not just
partisan intimidation but voting was part of the strategy by which Hitler’s regime established itself.
Observers have not, as a result, concluded that voting is too risky for the democratic process.
Deliberative reasoning is not without its herd aspects, and the genteelly literate may be less
discriminating than they seem. Critical consciousness is nurtured not only in literate communication or

turn-taking discussion but also in collective bodily experience. We need involved and informed voters
alike. These will rarely, and need not, be equally developed aspects in every elector. Rooting for the
home team with all the romance and drama of the ballﬁeld leads fans to be interested not only in
baseball scores and histories, but also in team strategies, strengths, and weaknesses. We should trust
political spectacle that much.
Congregational crowds contribute to a richer, more vital and responsive civic life. They are
arenas of social fertility and political action. They create shared feelings of legitimacy in nations that call
themselves democracies and count themselves as ideologically committed to the “people.” Democratic
publics can take stock of themselves only by gathering indiscriminately together. This is what electoral
crowds offer. In the ritual proximity of popular assembly, citizens may combine in politically new and
creative ways, encounter those with whom they share the world, and animate their aspirations with the
force of live congregational experience.
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